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Abstract 
This paper argues that differentiated integration can be understood more 
thoroughly by using a multi-level approach that conceives of the nation state 
as an aggregate of partly autonomous subunits and actors. The participation of 
such components in European integration is influenced by a combination of 
type of policy through which integration is pursued, national heterogeneity, 
their loosely coupledness within national systems. By examining the case of 
the European Research Area, we document patterns of differentiated 
integration across governance levels and discuss how the following factors 
shape these patterns:  the competitive nature of the European distributive 
instruments, stark variation in national and sub-national material conditions 
and in the governance of national research systems, as well as the normative 
and cognitive factors specific to the research policy sector. The conceptual and 
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Introduction 
Under which conditions does differentiated integration (DI) take place in the 
European Union (EU)? Elements of answer to this fundamental question have 
been given by Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig (2013), with reference 
to the varying interdependence between countries and varying degree of 
politicization of policies. In their views, interdependence is a variable through 
which states are able to calculate costs and benefits of opting in and/or out 
while concomitantly taking into consideration prior integration dynamics and 
promotion of integration by supranational actors. While intergovernmentalist 
and supranationalist perspectives highlight part of the conundrum related to 
DI, other scholars have pointed to the discrepancy between the formal aspects 
of opt-ins and opt-outs and their concrete enactment (see e.g. Adler-Nissen 
2009).  
 
Part of the problem derives from the focus at the state level of the existing 
literature on DI. As the main analytical category, member states can be seen to 
opt in and/or out of European Union governance arrangements of different 
policy sectors (i.e. vertical differentiation); while non-members are included in 
some common European regulatory regimes and not in others (i.e. horizontal 
differentiation). This idea of DI leaves the nation state ‘intact’ as states sign up 
to the same commitments and differentiation concerns the pattern of exclusion 
and inclusion of states. Yet a state-centric perspective neglects the inherent 
multi-level character of nation states. The state is a highly differentiated actor 
with multiple components contributing to ‘a complex process involving 
multiple actors pursuing a wide range of individual and organizational goals, 
as well as pursuing the collective goals of the society’ (Peters and Pierre 2009: 
92). Indeed, integration processes span several interconnected levels of 
governance and include societal actors (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). This 
displays how states are not monolithic and points to how relatively 
autonomous actors and units that are loosely coupled within national systems 
can be connected at a European level, thereby challenging the internal 
cohesion of national systems (Egeberg 2004).  
 
As such, DI does not just happen across states. It also happens within them 
and among components belonging to different states that connect to each other 
and/or to the European level. Similar actors within the same state can be 
integrated in different ways and degrees. This phenomenon, referred to as 
‘multi-level differentiation’ (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012), is largely 
understudied, as the literature on DI mostly focuses on the state level 
(however see Holzinger 2000).   
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In this paper we take on a multi-level approach and conceive of DI also as the 
actual practices of opt-ins and opt-outs and not only as the formal 
arrangements of state participation in EU policies and rules. In addition to the 
expected effect of interdependence and politicization, we identify institutional 
and normative-ideational factors that can be expected to shape patterns of DI.   
 
To illustrate how DI plays out and to explain its patterns, we perform an 
analysis of the European Research Area (ERA), a policy sector whose 
relevance has increased substantially in the European agenda in terms of 
policy ambitions, scope of distributive mechanisms, as well as regards the 
involvement of a large number of European countries – well beyond EU 
members. Focusing on the case of research policy, we ask: what are the factors 
that shape patterns of DI in this attempt to create an integrated European area?  
 
The choice of ERA as a case study to answer this main question is twofold. On 
the one hand, EU research policy is an area where commitments are uniform 
between states and where there are explicit shared ambitions to create a 
common area for the ‘free flow of knowledge’. ERA is an area where 
integration is not pursued through community legislation, but by incentive 
programmes and soft modes of governance and hence an area that can 
accommodate the participation of non-member states (Lavenex 2009). Thus 
ERA is inherently a case of external DI (Leuffen, Rittberger and 
Schimmelfennig 2013). On the other hand, states and national sub-units and 
actors, notwithstanding uniform formal commitments, vary considerably in 
their concrete practices of integration in ERA. Practices of DI in this area allow 
us to examine how the competitive nature of the European distributive 
instruments, the variation in national and sub-national material conditions, in 
the governance of national systems, as well as the sector-specific normative 
and cognitive elements of science and academia, shape patterns of DI.  
 
In so doing, our paper distinguishes multi-level differentiation from 
Europeanization and implementation studies: Europeanization refers to how 
nation states, subnational components, societies and citizens take on European 
legal frameworks, policies, norms, values and identities (see e.g. Radaelli 
2003). Implementation studies scrutinize the different impacts of and 
adaptations to EU policies at national and sub-national level (see e.g. Milio 
2010). In the case of multi-level differentiation, we explain the patterns of 
integration of nation states and relevant subnational actors, that is, we 
examine the factors that allow/limit opt-ins and outs to a EU policy sector. 
Indeed the nature of European allocation mechanisms (mainly the Framework 
Programs and Horizon 2020) is a distinctive characteristic of the ERA: research 
groups and/or individual academics within universities and research 
organizations in national contexts compete for research funding through 
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highly selective processes. Hence, while ERA members and associate members 
comply with the same rules, equal competition among unequals shapes 
patterns of opting in and out.  The aim of this paper is to shed light on how 
such inequality plays out creating DI and to explain such patterns with a 
multi-level approach.  
 
The next section conceptualizes DI and formulates expectations with respect to 
our multi-level approach. We then analyse ERA and focus on six countries 
(both EU and non-EU member states). Finally we discuss our findings 
highlighting the relevance of DI for ERA, as well as the conceptual 
contributions of the paper to the debate on DI.   
 
Conceptualizing differentiated integration: A multi-level 
perspective on integration dynamics 
The EUs polity is multi-level, since the decision-making process is shared by 
various actors at different levels, including sub-national ones (Marks, Hooghe 
and Blank 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Scharpf 2002). Multi-level 
differentiation applies to policy areas where DI is reflected not only at the 
national level, but also at the European and/or sub-national levels (Holzinger 
2000). As such, multi-level differentiation can take place in policies where sub-
national entities (e.g. regions or cities) and/or non-state actors (i.e. NGOs or 
corporations) opt in/opt out with regards to specific EU institutions, 
instruments and policies.  
 
Given the multi-level nature of research policy, we understand 
interdependence with a broader scope. According to liberal 
intergovernmentalism, ‘an international constellation is characterized by 
interdependence, if states are unable to fulfil their security or welfare needs 
alone - or if it would be inefficient for them to act autonomously’ (Leuffen, 
Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2013: 43). An overarching definition is 
provided by Milner (2009: 15): ‘interdependence means mutual dependence, 
not necessarily symmetric, which brings benefits for all parties involved’. 
Instead we draw on the concept of complex interdependence (Keohane and 
Nye 1997) whereby multiple channels of action among states, 
transgovernmentally and transnationally, shape a multitude of linkages in the 
absence (or soft presence) of a hierarchy of issues on the political agenda. 
Complex interdependence characterizes ERA well, and resonates with the 
argument that autonomous national and subnational actors are able to de-
couple from their national systems and re-couple with the European level. We 
consider complex interdependence as a dimension of European integration: 
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hence, interdependence patterns help revealing how states and subnational 
actors are able to opt in and/or opt out of the ERA policies.   
 
The level of politicization, polarization of opinions, interests or values of a 
functional area is a contextual feature affecting patterns of participation and 
interaction in European integration. Moreover, we assume that low level of 
political contestation in a policy area leaves more leeway for transnational 
integration not channelled through the central state level.  
 
However, from an institutional perspective interdependence and politicization 
provide a partial understanding of the dynamics of DI. We can assume that 
the characteristics of European institutions and their capabilities affect their 
role in shaping actors’ preferences as well as identities and consequently their 
behaviour (Egeberg 2004). In the context of DI, opt-ins are not only determined 
by actors’ calculation of gains and losses but also by what is right and 
legitimate to do. State ministries, agencies and public organizations, national, 
regional and local entities vary in terms of how strongly they are vertically 
and horizontally integrated into national systems, which in turn will affect the 
dynamics of integration (Egeberg 2006). Agencies and public organizations, 
with different levels of autonomy from the coordinating/steering role of the 
state, have their own interests and identities supporting or constraining their 
involvement in the integration process. Finally, other non-state actors, such as 
businesses, professionals, civil associations etc. are differently linked to 
supranational or national institutions, and should thus be incorporated as part 
of the dynamics of (differentiated) integration in Europe (Fligstein 2008).  
 
Consequently we can expect that the following factors affect the dynamics of 
DI in a multi-level setting:    
 
1. Institutional arrangements and instruments at the EU level comprise the 
capacity at European level to pursue integrative agendas – this refers 
both to the decision-making capacity and formal legal rules constituting 
the basis for common European and executive capacity at the 
supranational level, and the extent to which they encourage 
involvement of state actors or non-/sub-state actors. We expect that 
distributive policies as opposed to integration via EU legislation will 
create easier access for non-members to opt in since it can more easily 
open up institutional venues for the participation of non-member states 
(Lavenex 2009).   
2. Diversity of national systems affects patterns of inclusion to and exclusion 
from EU policy sectors based primarily on distributive policy. As 
argued by Héritier (1999: 81), in principle distributive policy implies 
that resources are distributed indiscriminately across regions, groups 
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and, in the case of the EU, across countries. Yet, even though countries 
and sub-national actors are given equal treatment, uneven material 
positions will deepen existing inequalities and consequently produce 
DI. In the case of ERA, we expect that a research system with a strong 
investment from the state will be more integrated at European level.  
3. Governance of national policy systems shapes integration patterns 
depending on the form of the state, on national policy systems, on the 
degree of autonomy of sub-national actors. Hence, on the one hand a 
unitary state will usually have a unitary research system, with its 
components being similar – and acting similarly – across regions. On the 
other hand, a federal state will steer its research system in coordination 
with its sub-national components. Research policy will thus present 
regulatory measures, laws, funding priorities and actions promulgated 
by a central authority or by several authorities located at different levels. 
We thus expect patterns of DI within states to be more accentuated in 
decentralized research policy sectors than in unitary national systems. 
In a similar way, the components of a research system – universities and 
research organizations – will be more able to connect to the EU by 
successfully participating in competitive calls for research funding. 
4. Normative and cognitive elements are particularly relevant in sectors that 
have strong cultural and identity-related underpinnings. Science and 
academia are founded on strong values and beliefs that are based on the 
academic profession, on disciplinary fields and on type of universities 
and research organizations. Additionally, academics and scientists relate 
to their disciplinary community, which display distinctive dynamics, 
e.g. natural vs. social sciences. Finally, and more recently, organizational 
affiliations play a role: hence a traditional comprehensive university acts 
differently than a polytechnic or a technological university. We thus 
expect that national systemic and sub-systemic cultural characteristics 
enable/constrain actors to engage with EU distributive policy and that 
these heterogeneities produce patterns of DI.  
 
In order to examine these expectations we first identify the sector specific 
instruments and institutions of the EU in this policy area based on secondary 
analysis (see Chou and Gornitzka 2014). On the basis of specific indicators 
measuring the degree of inclusion in ERA, we illustrate patterns of inclusion 
and exclusion of states, research systems and universities in the process 
towards establishing the ERA, and examine DI against its distributive policy. 
We finally compare six national cases to probe the argument that national 
systemic heterogeneity affects patterns of DI and that a multi-level approach is 
necessary to capture DI patterns: four EU member states (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland and the Netherlands) and two associated countries (Norway and 
Switzerland).  
Tatiana Fumasoli, Åse Gornitzka and Benjamin Leruth 
6 ARENA Working Paper 02/2015 
 
Patterns of differentiated integration in ERA  
 
Institutionalizing EU distributive policy 
Ambitions for European cooperation in science and technology were visible at 
the very start of the European integration process (de Elera 2006). Yet the 
transfer of national competencies of research and development to the EU level 
for regulation by law was contested and integration via supranational 
legislation only featured marginally or indirectly. The main national research 
policy instruments – organization of research systems and basic funding of 
research institutions and universities, as well as project-based support to 
industrial research and development (R&D) and public research institutions - 
remained within the national purview. The EU approach rested within soft 
modes of coordination based on the principle of subsidiarity. However, 
concomitantly, the use of ‘the power of the supranational purse’ developed 
through the institutionalisation of the EU’s multiannual framework 
programmes (FPs) for R&D. Launched in 1984 the FPs became integrated into 
one ‘package’ that over the years expanded the EU thematic/sectoral reach 
and grew steadily in absolute terms and in their share of the European 
budgets (see table 1). From a fairly narrow focus on specific technological 
areas the FPs sub-programmes now encompass most topics of research eligible 
for funding. The supranational elements were also strengthened by anchoring 
the FPs in the Treaties, and increasingly supranational elements in the FPs’ 
mode of decision making were written into the EU treaties (Chou and 
Gornitzka 2014, p. 16).  
 
The launch of the ERA in 2000 added to the importance of the supranational 
layer of governance calling for a stronger emphasis on a common EU 
approach to research and technology. This, it argued, was needed to address 
problems of fragmentation of the research system(s) in Europe that had 
purportedly an adverse effect on the competitiveness in European economies 
and research systems. The underlying rationale of ERA addressed the problem 
of complex interdependence of European research systems, which were seen 
as not sufficiently integrated and competitive. Soft modes of governance and 
common voluntary standards to promote integration were developed 
alongside the FPs for realising the ERA, such as standards for recruitment of 
academic personnel, policy coordination among member states to promote 
increasing investment in R&D. Instruments based on the principle of variable 
geometry (e.g. coordinating national funding agencies programmes) and 
intergovernmental programs were seen as part of the ERA instruments. Also 
some pieces of EU ‘hard law’ were introduced in ERA, particularly to attract 
foreign researchers to ERA. These additions were layered on to the ERA 
without breaking with FPs and supranational distributive policy as the 
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mainframe for integration in this policy area. In 2007 the European Research 
Council (ERC) was established as part of the FPs (from 2014 called Horizon 
2020). This represented a clear break with the rest of the FPs as it embodied a 
distributive policy that catered only for investigator-driven research, scientific 
excellence, and with no concern for transnationality or immediate 
applicability/socio-economic relevance.   
  
By expanding its distributive policy in the shape of the FPs, the EU has 
constituted itself as a research policy actor and an emerging executive centre 
in research policy. Executive powers have become anchored in European-level 
institutions acting relatively independently from already existing national 
executive centres (Curtin and Egeberg 2008). By shaping and implementing 
the programmes for R&D, the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
(DG) Research established itself as a major funding agency.  Equally DG 
Research assisted the development of transnational policy networks of 
researchers, sub-national stakeholder groups, national research councils, and 
industry and enterprises in dense interaction at European level, as clearly seen 
in the DG Research’s expert groups system (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011). 
These distributive policies involve a multi-level pattern of interaction with the 
DG research as the node, and an area particularly prone to the ‘politics of 
expertise’ where national political leadership is less involved in everyday 
integration. 
 
Consequently this sector was dominated by a sectorial logic of action and low 
level of politicization. Yet it was combined with ‘squirts’ of political interest at 
peak hours when budgets and overall commitment to research programs were 
decided (Peterson 1995). Even though EU ambitions towards a knowledge-
based economy in global competition have lifted the political attention to joint 
research and technology efforts, the daily interaction still does not generate 
party political controversy and attention among the general electorate, nor 
sharp public controversy among EU member states (Chou  2014: 46). In 
national policy-making and implementation, in politics and in national civil 
society, this is predominantly seen as a non-politicized domain where experts 
and national agencies act at an arm’s length from direct political steering. This 
seems also to have translated into the public perception of the integration in 
this area: in stark contrast to the attitudes among Europeans towards EU 
involvement in education systems, Europeans seem more than willing to 
confer a stronger role for research and technology policy (Eurobarometer 
2010). Consequently, the counter-forces to European integration in this area do 
not stem from a national sensitivity attached to it among the electorate. 
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Territorial expansion and opting-in patterns at state level  
ERA’s distributive policies have not developed at the centre stage of EU 
politics and have been marked by a non-politicized mode of decision making. 
However, the research policy sector has been highly affected by the overall 
development of European integration. Since distributive policies are not based 
on a variable geometry principle, the territorial scope of European research 
programs has expanded with each enlargement (see Table 1).  Especially, the 
most recent enlargements have led to the inclusion into the ERA ‘by default’ of 
weakly developed national research systems.  
  
Furthermore rationales of non-EU member states welcomed into ERA contain 
different institutionalized modes of integration characterized by soft modes 
and/or functional-technological logic.  Soft modes enhance integration in 
research through distributive mechanisms, problem solving, benchmarking, 
ideational and normative models, while a functional-technological logic 
assumes that integration is instrumental to the performance, efficiency, 
expertise and knowledge at hand. These different rationales have allowed 
various non-EU members to participate in ERA.  
 
Table 1: Evolution of membership to the Framework Programs 















FP budget  
(EUR million) 
3,750 5,396 6,600 13,215 14,960 17,883 50,521 
EU Members BE, DK, 
FR, DE, 












    IC, FL, NO   
Bilateral 
relations  
and ENP  
     CH, IL FO, MD 





      AL, BH 
Members and 
Associated 
12 12 12 15 15+3 25+5 27+14 
Source: Erawatch, Innovation Report 2011, Swiss Report on FP7 (2013) 
*EU member since 2013 
 
Table 1 reflects countries’ full participation to the FPs since their inception in 
1984. Expanding budgets for supranational distributive policies and 
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considerable territorial expansion have gone hand in hand with increasing 
heterogeneity of participating research systems.  
 
The EU has built different paths towards full participation in ERA, which is 
granted automatically by EU membership. Indeed, this was the only possible 
trajectory until 1995. However, in 1999, the status of associated country (full 
access to the FPs without EU membership) was granted to the EEA countries. 
Since then, additional routes to participation have been opened up: candidate 
states access ERA as associated countries during the negotiations, as do 
potential candidates to EU membership. Access has also been given to 
countries that have negotiated bilateral relations with the EU and to 
participants in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which started with 
the 2004 enlargement. Although Israel is part of ENP, its (partial) participation 
in the FPs dates back to 1996. As the only non-European country associated to 
ERA, Israel has been welcomed for its traditionally strong scientific 
cooperation with Europe, and the intensity of its R&D.  
 
The ERA is thus an instrument of integration which allows participation in 
‘equal competition’ to countries that are to become EU members, have 
institutionalized linkages to the EU, have strong performance in science, and 
are at the borders of the enlarged EU. Against this backdrop Brussels refers to 
technical/institutional criteria (e.g. compatibility of research systems), and 
broader political conditions, as demonstrated by the recent (successful) 
negotiations to (re-) access Horizon 2020 (FP8) with Israel and  Switzerland. 
 
Heterogeneity of national research systems 
Historically, the integrative agenda has hit its head against the multi-level and 
diversified character of European research systems, and since the beginning of 
the 1970s it has grappled with vertical and horizontal co-ordination. Kaiser 
and Prange (2004: 250-251) highlight how the multi-level character of research 
systems varies according to policies, institutions and national coordination 
mechanisms, as well as in relation with the number of administrative levels 
involved and the degree of autonomy of subnational institutions. National 
diversity articulates around distinctive structures and performance of research 
systems, while national idiosyncrasies make integration challenging. 
 
Variations in research systems between and within state systems are 
reproduced and amplified by processes of integration in research policy, a 
European ‘Matthew effect’1 characterizes the skewed distribution of resources 
                                                 
1 Merton (1968: 159) defines a Matthew-effect as ‘the accruing of greater increments of 
recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute and the 
withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark’. 
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between the European integrated advanced knowledge systems and the 
European disconnected knowledge systems with weak capabilities and status. 
Even more, the Matthew effect takes place also within national systems and 
subnational institutions, where DI divides ‘excellent Europeans’ and ‘locals’.  
 
The most important differences among European countries2 are the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) pro capita, as well investment on innovation 
measured by Gross domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) and investment on 
higher education measured by Higher-education expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP (HERD). Overall, we can distinguish three groups 
according to size as of inhabitants: the five big countries (Germany, the UK, 
France, Italy and Spain), several mid-size countries (between 5 and 30 million 
inhabitants) and small ones with less than 5 million inhabitants. The GDP pro 
capita mirrors differences between North and South, West and East, as well as 
older and more recent EU members. These differences resonate also in relation 
with GERD and HERD with distinctive exceptions (Israel).  
 
The effects of EUs distributive policy in combination with national 
heterogeneity on integration in ERA are striking when measured by the 
allocation of funds, the level of competitiveness in the application process and 
the number of ERC grants. Table 2 shows that the four biggest countries have 
received 51.1% of FP7 funds. The following six countries score 28.6%. Thus the 
first ten best performing countries obtained almost 80% of available FPs funds. 
All in all the 15 top performers receive more than 90% total FP7 budget, 
leaving the remaining 26 countries with less than 10%. 
 
Table 2 shows that when it comes to the best performing countries, the 
Western European states, and most of the EU15 are included with 
Switzerland, Israel and Norway. As of the top 20, besides Ireland and 
Portugal, three Central European countries are found. The remaining 21 
countries, besides the above mentioned smallest ones, are the Balkan 
countries, the Baltic countries, Slovakia, and Moldova. 
 
As regards competitiveness in applications, measured by funded applications 
to submitted applications and by the amount of funds obtained to total funds 
requested, the best performing countries remain practically the same.  
 
The number of ERC grants reflects mainly these patterns, where the group of 
top five performers is followed by the other Western European countries, 
Israel, Hungary and Poland. Further 10 countries have received less than 10 
ERC grants out of a total of 4034 between 2007 and 2013: Bulgaria, Croatia, 
                                                 
2 See Table in Appendix. 
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Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iceland and 
Turkey. At the bottom, there are 11 countries with no ERC grants: Albania, 
Bosnia Herzegovina, Faroe Islands, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM), Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Moldova, 
Montenegro, and Serbia.  
 
Table 2: Funding, competitiveness, cooperation in the FP7  
  Funds 
allocation  












Germany 16.2 7 1 2 
United Kingdom 14.9 6 2 1 
France 11.7 3 3 3 
Italy 8.3 22 4 6 
Netherlands 6.9 2 5 4 
Spain 6.9 15 6 7 
Switzerland 4.3 3* 7 5 
Belgium 3.9 1 9 10 
Sweden 3.9 4 8 9 
Austria 2.7 12 10 11 
Greece 2.5 25 9 16 
Denmark 2.2 5 12 12 
Finland 2.2 9 11 13 
Israel 1.9 15* 13 8 
Norway 1.7 4* 14 14 
Ireland 1.3 8 15 15 
Poland 1.1 19 17 19 
Portugal 1.1 18 16 18 
Czech Republic 0.7 16 19 21 
Hungary 0.7 14 18 17 
Romania 0.4 27 22   
Slovenia 0.4 26 21 24 
Turkey 0.4  20 24 
Bulgaria 0.3 24 23 21 
EE, CY, SK, HR, 
LI, RS, LT, LU, LV, 
MT, MK, ME, BH, 
MD, AL, FO 
< 0.3 
   
Source: Erawatch, Innovation Report 2011. 
*Swiss Report on FP7 (2013) 
**Indicates ranking of member states in relation with number of funded applications against 
total number of applications 
***Indicates ranking of member states in relation with funds granted against funds applied 
****Indicates ranking of member states in relation with number of ERC grants obtained 
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National governance systems compared: differentiated integration 
across and within states  
We have compared Austria, Belgium, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. The rationale for this selection is to analyse countries with 
significant similarities (Western European, wealthy, of medium size countries) 
and distinctive differences (EU and non-EU members, unitary and federal 
state organization). These have all participated in FP7, either as EU member 
states or as associated countries (Norway and Switzerland). They rank among 
the best performing 15 systems, however, at a closer look, they display diverse 
patterns of inclusion in and exclusion from ERA. Significant differences in 
fund distribution can be observed, ranging from the Netherlands (with almost 
7 per cent) to Norway (with less than 2 per cent). As of ERC grants received, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland rank fourth and fifth, achieving a 
distribution share that is even higher than their general FP share (in 2011); 
while Belgium, Austria, Finland and Norway score worse in ERC grants than 
in general FP funding. This indicates that, notwithstanding size and GDP, 
universities and top researchers inside universities have different capabilities 
when it comes to accessing ERC grants. 
 
The ERC grants are indicators of the extent to which universities achieve 
excellence in frontier research and display high variance in our sample. 
Digging into individual universities and research organizations there is also 
variation: ERC grants are spread among five Dutch and four Swiss higher 
education institutions, whilst Belgium, Finland and Norway have just one 
high achieving university, and Austria none. Noteworthy is also the difference 
in types of universities: in Switzerland the best results are attained by the two 
federal institutes of technology and the two flagship universities, in the 
Netherlands by one technological university and four comprehensive 
universities, while in Belgium, Finland and Norway, ERC grants are mainly 
granted to their flagship universities. 
 
Austria, Belgium and Switzerland are federal systems where research policy 
responsibility is shared among different state actors at central and federal 
levels. Austria has been increasingly strengthening national coordination in 
the hands of the federal government, which distributes more than 84 per cent 
of public funding. Switzerland, too, has enhanced an increasingly common 
framework for research activities in the public sector, by bundling education, 
research and innovation under the roof of the ministry of economics. 
However, the cantons still hold full control on their universities. Belgium, too, 
has a decentralized national system, now organized in three separated regions 
(Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels-Capital), three communities (French-, Flemish- 
and German- speaking), and the federal state, responsible for international 
A Multi-level Approach to Differentiated Integration 
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space and defence research.  Finland, the Netherlands and Norway have 
unitary state structures, which promulgate laws and regulations, as well as 
elaborate policies and decide on funding of research. In Finland and the 
Netherlands basic research and innovation are located under the roof of the 
ministries of education and of economics, while in Norway, similarly to 
Austria and Switzerland, there is a single ministry.  
 












Among Top 50 
participants 
organizations in FP7 
 
Universities with >20 
ERC grants (07.2013) 




Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research 
-Delft University of 
Technology 
-University of Amsterdam 
-University of Utrecht 
-Radboud University 
Nijmegen 
-Eindhoven University of 
Technology 








CH 4.3% 7 298 
7.4% 
-Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology in 
Lausanne 
-Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology Zurich 
-University of Zurich 
-University of Geneva 
-Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology in 
Lausanne 
-Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology Zurich 
-University of Zurich 
-University of Geneva 
BE 3.9% 8 137 
3.4% 
-University of Leuven  
-IMEC Interuniversity 
MicroElectronics Center 
University of Leuven 
AT 2.7% 10 100 
2.5% 
  
FI 2.2% 13 64 
1.6% 
-VTT Technical 
Research Centre of 
Finland 
-University of Helsinki 
University of Helsinki 
NO 1.7% 15 41 
1.0% 
-SINTEF The Foundation 
for Scientific and 
Industrial Research 
University of Oslo 
Source: Erawatch, Innovation Report 2011, Swiss Report on FP7 (2013) 
 
The coordination mode of research policy is an important condition explaining 
different patterns in federal countries. In the Nordic countries, the 
geographical dimension is significant, since climate conditions in the North do 
not encourage research-intensive infrastructures in scarcely populated areas 
(see e.g. Rokkan and Valen 1962). The autonomy of universities is an 
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additional explanatory factor, which shows that European integration is also a 
matter of organizational strategy. Hence some universities, particularly in 
Switzerland and Austria, have defined ERC grants as an overarching strategic 
goal in order to boost their scientific reputation. Universities’ relative 
institutional autonomy has enhanced their capabilities to compete for FP 
funding against universities in more rigid regulatory frameworks.  
 
Resonating with the findings as concerns the state level, we observe that 
centrally located universities, larger universities and specific types of research 
institutions are more likely to participate in ERA. 
 
Finally, the divide among departments within universities in accessing 
European funding is explained by disciplinary fields (natural and technical 
sciences versus humanities and social sciences), size in terms of academic staff, 
students and resources, and history as high performers. This points to the 
well-known division between hard and soft sciences, as well as to more fine-
grained differences among ‘European’ and ‘local’ universities as well as 
disciplinary fields.  
 
Discussion 
We took as a starting point that ERA was expected to be a case of DI – do the 
patterns detected support this expectation? The uniform commitment to ERA 
and the fact that no member states have opted out from this policy would 
speak against this backdrop. Yet, as expected, for non-member states ERA is 
more inclusive, expansive and flexible than most other areas of the EU, such as 
the Schengen agreement or the Economic and Monetary Union, and in this 
sense it contributes to the overall pattern of DI. Moreover, among the 
instruments of ERA there are several initiatives that accommodate varying 
member state commitments to a common European research policy. Besides 
external differentiation, we find DI in the case of ERA when we see 1) DI as 
practice and not only as the formal commitment or opt-in to common rules 
and policies and 2) when we include sub-national and non-state actors in 
addition to the states.  
 
What can the ERA case tell us on why and how patterns of DI occur? The 
patterns of inclusion and opt-ins at state level to ERA are founded on several 
mechanisms. One mechanism is clearly consistent with the main argument of 
core DI scholarship: the opt-in rationale is a functional logic that point to how 
the economic and R&D interdependences in Europe create a need for 
establishing a common area as a solution to the fragmentation and 
inefficiencies of national systems. This functional logic also applies to the 
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inclusion of non-EU members that have strong scientific systems and 
economies (Switzerland, Israel and Norway). These countries also can reap the 
benefits of opting-in on funding and collaborative opportunities that ERA 
offers. Such inclusion does not involve high political costs. Although the cases 
of Israel and Switzerland demonstrate that the EU’s (threat of) exclusion from 
ERA can ensue from politicization of other issues in the relationship between 
the EU and third countries.   
 
The interdependence argument is less equipped to account for the 
inclusion/opt-in when it comes to countries with weak research systems at the 
scientific periphery, more dependent on than interdependent with research 
systems of the EU. Here the spillover from other policy areas is a more 
relevant mechanism – the link to the Common Foreign and Security Policy as 
well as to the European Neighbourhood Policy shapes patterns of integration 
into ERA. A theoretical argument can consequently be made: the type of 
policy area combined with the low level of politicization (i.e. research policy as 
technical, academic territory, and high symbolic value of scientific diplomacy) 
contribute to inclusion/opt-in.  
 
The type of policy, together with the capacities and structures established to 
implement them at the EU level, have shaped distinctive trajectories and 
variegated integration across European countries. Distributive mechanisms 
based on (increasingly) competitive criteria and on functional/technical 
rationales affect the intensity of interconnections between national and sub-
national actors and EU policies and institutions. Thus, heterogeneity in terms 
of national wealth, willingness and/or capability to invest in R&D as well as 
governance structures have produced distinctive patterns of DI. Consequently, 
it is not heterogeneity in member states’ will and preferences for European 
integration in this sector that have shaped DI but the capabilities of their 
respective research systems to de facto join a European area. Héritier’s (1999: 
80-81) point on the EU’s R&D policies of the 1980s and 1990s is, in this respect, 
still valid: the equal treatment of actors in uneven material positions deepens 
existing inequalities. The implication for studies of DI as practice would have 
to take into account what types of instruments the EU deploys to pursue 
integrative agendas and the potential for differentiation that they carry.  
 
In line with this, we also note that neither the increasingly supranational 
character of EU distributive policies in this area nor the distributive 
skewedness resulting from the practices and principles of FPs have politicized 
the EU research policy. How can this lack of contestation be accounted for?  
First, the overall low-level politicization of the policy sectors is a clear 
conditional factor – there is little to be gained from national electorate from 
contesting EU distributive policy in research. This allows DI to take place 
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despite the negative distributive implications for some member states. Second, 
the normative value attached to ‘scientific excellence’, its technical character, 
and norms of scientific self-governance in this area are likely to make actors at 
national and sub-national level accept the terms of DI making it less legitimate 
to ‘pull the national interest card’. On the other hand, the politics of expertise 
argument might be overstated, as battles over the level and priorities of EU 
research policy have displayed divisions among losing and winning members 
states in EU research policy. Contestation over EU research has also been dealt 
with by exporting the issue to other sectors and EU instruments, 
compensating ‘losers’ from other items in the EU budget. For instance, the 
Europe 2020 strategy capacity building in research and innovation has become 
a more pronounced aspect in the regional policy instruments of the EU 
(Camagni and Capello 2013), where regional redistribution is legitimate and 
expected. There are also other instruments in the ERA policy toolbox that are 
more apt to accommodate national and sub-national disparities that our focus 
on the distributive policy does not capture. That is a source of potential bias in 
our analysis. Yet, the basic distributive character of EU research funding has 
remained a key and increasing part of the EU’s overall budget and its 
fundamental principles have not been redesigned to accommodate concerns 
for more even regional/country distribution.  
 
The EU’s distributive policies have occasioned strong non-state actors (sub-
national research organizations and groups) to directly interact with the DG 
Research as the main distributive agent at the EU level, thus underlining the 
multi-level character of integration in this sector. The characteristics of the 
state (federal versus unitary) and its steering mode (state control versus 
agencies’ autonomy) are reflected in the organization of national research 
systems. In the latter, universities possess a certain degree of autonomy to 
define their own objectives. However, at this level, too, structural conditions 
frame actors’ room for manoeuvre: size, type of university, political and 
geographical centre-periphery position, as well as public endowment are 
factors contributing to how far universities are able to participate in ERA. 
Patterns of opting-in and opting-out are conditioned by the fact that also 
symbolic gains accrue from joining successfully ERA, especially with the 
introduction of ERC. Common standards of excellence diffused by the ERC 
can be understood as a cultural and normative integration process. Arguably, 
normative and ideational factors at several levels contribute to shape patterns 
of DI. 
 
However, one should ask to what extent the FPs and Horizon 2020 funding 
schemes are sustainable, if not substantially supported and coordinated by 
national policies. Commitment to ERA in the EU institutions is considerable – 
but the de facto practicing of this commitment at national level is significantly 
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lower (European Commission 2012). At the state level, we have seen that a 
purely functional argument for inclusion can be undermined by demands 
from outside the sector (Switzerland temporarily being ‘blocked’ from opting-
in on the Horizon 2020) but also the nature of distributive policy is a volatile 
logic of competition and strategic action among both national and sub-national 
actors.  This links to the temporal dimension of DI and questions linear 
trajectories towards permanent integration. Instead, integration patterns are 
also susceptible to disintegration and change (back and forth) as of intensity. 
 
Without entering into a micro-level analysis, we argue that not only the nature 
of the academic enterprise is prone to such disparities, but also that the design 




The dynamics of DI in ERA support the idea that EU distributive policy 
without the use of hard law and without direct elements of redistribution 
allows relatively consensual commitment among member states and the 
smooth inclusion of non-members into common area building without any 
guarantee of juste retour.  
 
In accounting for the patterns of DI interdependence and level of politicization 
are relevant. ERA has been launched to address fragmented yet mutually 
dependent national systems and this concern is clearly relevant for 
understanding opt-in patterns. Low politicization has made flexible inclusion 
of non-members into ERA possible. However we have seen that these two 
arguments are not sufficient to understand especially the overall and multi-
level type of integration that has taken place in this case. National and sub-
national heterogeneity together with the supranational character of 
distributive programs and the principle of ‘equal distribution among 
unequals’ create striking patterns of DI both at national and sub-system level. 
Norms and values of the policy sector and the scientific ‘institutional sphere’ 
have been conductive to sustain and shape this pattern (see Kölliker 2001).  
 
All member states are fully signed up to ERA. Yet, in practice, there are still 
large differences in their participation. For, the determinant of their de facto 
participation is how far their individual research institutions opt-in to EU 
research funding programmes in practice. Whilst uniform in their formal 
participation in FP7, each country has ended up being internally differentiated 
in relation to the FPs. Within each country there is a clear divide between EU 
integrated research institutions and regional/local ones. Moreover, the 
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number of institutions on either side of the divide, and the reasons why some 
have ended up on one side or the other, are quite different from one country to 
another. 
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Appendix 
Structural characteristics of national research systems*  
 Inhabitants  
(million) 






EU 505.7 25’500 2,06  
Germany 80.5 31,300 2.92 0.51 
United Kingdom 63.5 28,300 1.72 0.48 
France 65.6 27,500 2.26 0.48 
Italy 59.7 25,200 1.27 0.36 
Netherlands 16.7 32,800 2.16 0.75 
Spain 46.7 24,400 1.30 0.39 
Switzerland 8.0 40,800 3.00 0.80 
Belgium 11.2 30,400 2.24 0.46 
Sweden 9.6 32,700 3.41 0.90 
Austria 8.4 33,300 2.84 0.72 
Greece (2007) 11.1 19,200 0.69 0.30 
Denmark 5.6 32,100 2.99 0.90 
Finland 5.4 29,100 3.55 0.79 
Israel 7.8 19,800 4.40 0.58 
Norway 5.0 49,900 1.66 0.55 
Ireland 4.6 33,200 1.72 0.51 
Poland 38.5 16,800 0.90 0.27 
Portugal 10.5 19,200 1.50 0.59 
Czech Republic 10.5 20,300 0.64 0.28 
Hungary 9.9 16,700 1.30 0.23 
Romania 20.0 12,500 0.42 0.11 
Slovenia 2.1 20,900 2.80 0.29 
Turkey 74.7 7,500 0.86 0.39 
Bulgaria 7.3 12,100 0.64  
Estonia 1.3 18,000 2.18 0.62 
Cyprus 0.9 23,500 0.47  
Slovakia 5.4 19,100 0.82 0.18 
Croatia  4.3  15,600 0.75  
Iceland (2008)  0.3 28,500 2.40 0.66 
Liechtenstein  0.04  90,500     
Serbia  7.2  8,900  0.96   
Lithuania 3.0 17,900 0.90   
Luxembourg 0.5 67,100 1.51 0.19 
Latvia 2.2 15,900 0.66  
Malta 0.4 22,100 0.84   
FYROM  2.1  3,400  0.23   
Montenegro  0.6  9,400  1.15   
BH  3.9  6,200  0.02   
Moldova  3.6  1,500  0.41   
Albania  3.2  6,200  0.15   
Faroe Islands  0.05  32,400     
Source: (Erawatch, accessed 16.04.2014)  
*Countries are listed according to FP7 fund allocation 
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